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ABSTRACT 
 
An Analysis of Women and Terrorism: Perpetrators, Victims, Both? 
 
by  
Elizabeth L. Miller 
 
Advisor: Professor Anna Akasoy   
 
 
 
This paper will analyze women’s participation in terrorism under groups like al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State. It will research the use of violence within terrorist organizations, 
perpetrated by female participants. What leads women to join groups like the Islamic State? 
There will be an analysis of the factors that attract women to joining terrorist organizations, in 
addition to the practices of recruitment that aid in their radicalization. There is a misconception 
that women who join the Islamic State lack education, which is seen as the sole reasoning for 
their radicalization or involvement. In reality, several reasons exist leading to their participation. 
Women knowingly join the organization, and while some actively participate, others seldom 
understand the magnitude of what it means to be members of the organization. 
Although women are in fact perpetrators within the Islamic State, they are often also 
victims within the organization. I will focus on the Islamic State’s manipulation of those women 
involved with the organization, but also recognize that women’s agency exists as they inflict 
violence. There is growing focus on the examination of the Islamic State’s levels of violence, 
specifically their use of gendered violence regarding women. The Islamic State carries out 
violence against women in several different ways, including both physical and non-physical. 
More often, scholars focus on the violence perpetrated outside of their organization. It is 
 v 
essential to examine both the violence within and outside their organization to fully comprehend 
the massive violence they perpetrate, including the nonphysical violence 
As women are involved within the organization, or outside of the organization, they are 
often placed into categories, as guilty, or innocent, as victim or perpetrator. I intend to show that 
these are not mutually exclusive. Women can be categorized as individuals who are perpetrators, 
but who also experience violence. Associating women’s position’s with only one of these 
categories fails to recognize the complexity of their position and experiences within terrorist 
organizations. Do individuals deem the violence the Islamic State perpetrates against the women 
inside their organization as a lesser form of violence? Gendered constructs also create the 
perception that women are more susceptible to violence. I plan to examine the ideas of victim 
versus perpetrator, as these are not always separate characteristics of women.  
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I. Introduction  
In today’s representation of terrorist networks, the roles of women are often overlooked 
and women’s willingness to join terrorist organizations and participate in violence is questioned. 
This is seen especially in jihadist militant organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
Women are actively joining and carrying out both violent and support roles within terrorist 
organizations. It is essential to examine the process of women’s involvement in terrorism: why 
they join, how they are recruited, the rationale, and other important components of their 
radicalization. This paper will examine women’s involvement, examining their roles, positions 
and power. It will highlight women’s active agency in implementing violence, and carrying out 
certain roles and responsibilities for the Islamic State specifically. However, aspects of women’s 
agency and the limitations will be questioned. Although these roles exist for women, what are 
the power dynamics, and are they monitored and controlled by the authority of males within the 
group? In order to analyze these limitations, it is essential to discuss the gendered constructs in 
which individuals perceive and understand violence in general, and more specifically women’s 
contribution. Comparisons will be made by evaluating women involved in two well-known 
terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.  Additionally, these prominent 
organizations will be examined, as their ideologies are not completely compatible when it comes 
to permissible levels of female participation in violence.  
I will argue that women willingly participate in violence and act as perpetrators, they can 
also be the target of terrorism. Women can be both perpetrators and victims. They have agency 
in deciding to radicalize, but they also experience limitations in choice once involved. Women 
involved in the Islamic State especially act as perpetrators but are not free from experiencing the 
violence from male counterparts within the group.  
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II. Terminology 
What is Violence? 
 The visibility of women’s active participation in terrorism requires an analysis of the 
broader understanding of violence. What is violence? Is violence always visible? Is it always 
physical? There is a common tendency to associate violence and its use solely with its physical 
attributes. According to Merriam-Webster, violence is defined as, “the use of physical force so as 
to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy,” and, “an instance of violent treatment or procedure.”1  This 
general definition alludes to violence being understood through action, usually through physical 
force. The World Health Organization expands upon the more general definition, noting violence 
is considered, “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high 
likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.”2 
This description of violence allows for better examination of different types of violence. 
Although it specifies that physical force can be used, it broadens the definition showing that it is 
also use of power, which may not always be physical. This expansion of the definition allows for 
an examination of what can be considered invisible or nonphysical violence.  
In the chapter “An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors Involved in Jihadist 
Radicalization Process and Terrorist Violence,” Jesús Pérez Viejo and Ángeles Martínez Boyé3 
analyze the World Health Organizations classification and the complexity of violence types 
 
1 Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, s.v. “violence,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence. 
2 “Definition and Typology of Violence,” World Health Organization, November 21, 2011; See also, Jesús Pérez 
Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors Involved in Jihadist Radicalization 
Process and Terrorist Violence," In Radicalism and Terrorism in the 21st Century: Implications for Security, 93. 
3 For information on the contributors’ backgrounds see, “Notes on Contributors,” Radicalism and Terrorism in the 
21st Century: Implications for Security, 317-318.  Jesús Pérez Viejo and Ángeles Martínez Boyé both have 
backgrounds in social work, act as professors, and analyze gendered violence. 
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further. They describe violence as “an intended behavior destined to obtain domination and 
control, using force in an explicit or implicit manner with the aim of obtaining from a person or 
group of people what they do not want to freely consent to do.”4 In providing their own 
description of violence, they recognize that force is evident, but not necessarily always physical 
force. However, one interesting aspect of their definition highlights the idea of consent. What is 
considered free consent? Are there limitations? As an examination of women’s place in terrorist 
organizations, and their relationship with violence occurs, one will see the intricacy surrounding 
consent, when in the confines of a terrorist organization, like the Islamic State, whether their 
involvement is willing or unwilling.  
In addition to providing a description of violence, the article includes an account of the 
three types of violence as discussed by the sociologist Johan Galtung.5 
• Direct Violence, which refers to physical and/or verbal violence, which is the most 
visible type and the one referred to by most people; it is the one where we can identify 
victims and also killers.6 
 
• Structural violence, which is a part of the social structure and its mechanism. It is easy to 
identify the victims but not the killers, as the origin is not in specific people.7  
 
• Cultural violence refers to the group of values, ideas and convictions used to justify or 
legitimize structural or direct violence, and is the one that gives the perception of 
normality in exercise.8  
 
It is critical to specify these three types of violence. As noted, direct violence is what most 
consider when thinking about violence, and the violence of terrorist groups. This direct violence 
can be seen in terrorist attacks, through suicide bombings, or other physical warfare methods. 
The structural violence of terrorist groups, is often seen in manipulation, and exploitation, in 
 
4 Jesús Pérez Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors,” 93-94. 
5 Jesús Pérez Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors,” 94.  
6 Jesús Pérez Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors,” 94. 
7 Jesús Pérez Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors,” 94. 
8 Jesús Pérez Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors," 94. The types of 
violence described in this paper were pulled directly from this source and not rephrased.   
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addition to sexism and strict permissions of women’s place. The cultural violence of groups like 
the Islamic State, can be seen in their implantation of violence, of how they provide religious and 
political justifications for it. In terrorist organizations all three forms are utilized. Women 
participate in this violence as active members of terrorist organizations but also experience this 
violence as victims. These categories of violence are not rigid, and more often than not, overlap 
when utilized by groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.  
 
What is Terrorism? 
In order to examine levels of violence and its relation to women, it is also necessary to 
provide a clarification of a certain type of violence being evaluated. Terrorism is a well-known 
form of violence that has garnered major attention during the 21st century.9 What is terrorism? 
What type of violence is terrorism? Like the definition of violence, there are several intricacies 
surrounding the understanding of terrorism. There is an absence of a universal definition of 
terrorism, although there are attempts to provide insight. Rushworth Kidder noted that, 
“terrorism is a phenomenon easier to describe than to define.”10 Kidder also provided further 
discussion about terrorism from Paul Wilkinson, who noted that the main component of 
terrorism “is the deliberate attempt to create fear, intensive fear, in order to coerce the wider 
target into giving in to what the terrorist wants.”11 Terrorism is further described as the “unlawful 
use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives.12 It is 
usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals, or groups, or to modify their 
 
9 Bruce Riedel, “The Grave New World: Terrorism in the 21st Century.” 
10 Rushworth Kidder, “Terrorism- A Term Notoriously Difficult to Pin Down,” 8. 
11 Rushworth Kidder, “Terrorism- A Term Notoriously Difficult to Pin Down,” 8. 
12 Rushworth Kidder, “Terrorism- A Term Notoriously Difficult to Pin Down,” 9. 
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behaviors or policies.”13 Acts of terrorism attempt to instill fear in individuals, while the 
underlying agenda is often politically motivated.   
Terrorism is often seen as direct violence, understood only when seen, although there are 
several other invisible components of the violence types utilized in terrorism. The violence used 
by terrorists is in fact direct, but also falls into the category of structural and cultural violence. 
Groups like the Islamic State demonstrate types of structural violence by embedding violent 
ideology in their social structure.14 Terrorist organizations aim to obtain complete domination 
and control, and do not solely use physical violence to achieve this. Their methods include 
propaganda and manipulation, against those outside of the terrorist group and those within. The 
recruitment and radicalization process are major examples of a terrorist group exerting violence 
in a nonphysical way. By utilizing different types of violence, like structural and cultural, 
terrorists attempt to legitimize their direct violence.15 It is important to evaluate the different 
forms of violence when analyzing the position of women involved in terrorism. Although women 
willingly participate in radical groups, they also can experience different types of structural and 
cultural violence during their recruitment process into a terrorist organization. Furthermore, 
violence of different types, like manipulation, coercion, and other forms of force are often used 
on women, even in the terrorist organization. These types of violence will be evaluated 
throughout the course of this research; however, it is crucial to note that this is not specific or 
unique to the Middle East, or Islam.  
 
 
13 Rushworth Kidder, “Terrorism- A Term Notoriously Difficult to Pin Down,” 9. 
14 Jesús Pérez Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors Involved in Jihadist 
Radicalization Process and Terrorist Violence," 93-94. 
15 Jesús Pérez Viejo, and Ángeles Martínez Boyé, "An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors Involved in Jihadist 
Radicalization Process and Terrorist Violence," 94. 
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III. Complexities  
Perpetrators & Victims – Both? 
  In addition to examining forms of violence, further evaluation is needed regarding the 
constructs of perpetrator and victim. These characterizations are often considered mutually 
exclusive and rigid. What is a perpetrator, a victim? Can someone be a perpetrator and a victim? 
How can an individual be a perpetrator and a victim simultaneously? A perpetrator is someone 
who carries out an immoral act, which is often violent. A victim is one who is harmed or affected 
by that action. Are these rigid classifications? In evaluating women’s involvement in terrorism, it 
is necessary to analyze this complexity in each case study.  In conflicts, women are automatically 
assumed to be victims.16 This paper will analyze women’s involvement in terrorism showing 
their willingness to participate in violence. They are also perpetrators. However, there are some 
situations in which women involved in terrorist groups are both a perpetrator and a victim.  
There are cases where a “woman has been abused, victimized, or targeted in ways that leave her 
little choice but to join the terrorists.”17 The choices made by women to join terrorist 
organizations are complicated and multifaceted.  Choices are made, but are those choices limited, 
controlled, manipulated? This complexity will be explored s in examples throughout this paper, 
especially through examples of women in the Islamic State policing other women, and inflicting 
violence against them. In conducting this analysis and research, each example of women’s 
involvement in terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, can be shown to challenge 
conventional constructs.  
 
 
16 Caroline O.N Moser and Fiona C Clark, “Introduction,” Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict 
and Political Violence, 4. 
17 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 31. 
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Gender & Agency in Violence 
For an analysis of women’s participation in violence, and more specifically terrorism, it 
is imperative to recognize the assumed gender constructs and limitations when discussing 
agency. What does this mean? Looking at scholarship from experts in gender can shed light on 
the analysis of gender in global politics. Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, both scholars of 
gender and violence evaluate the complication of gender constructs when examining women’s 
violence. They note, “deviant women are set up in opposition to idealized gender stereotypes.”18 
Gentry, in “Neo-Orientalist Narratives of Women’s Involvement in al-Qaeda,” mentions that 
when women contribute to violence, it is viewed as a disruption of an understood gender norm.19 
This gender norm insinuates that women are inherently not violent. Recognizing that analyzing 
agency through gender shows a different power dynamic within terrorism. Sjoberg and Gentry 
assert that in evaluating the place of women in global politics, one should challenge the gendered 
norms that continue to incorrectly influence the understanding of women’s agency.20 By doing 
this, research should be conducted through what they consider a “gendered lens” in which the 
power relation of gender is recognized, as are the “everyday experiences of women, taking into 
consideration social factors.”21 
They also discuss existing notions of feminist theory in relation to women’s agency when 
it comes to violence. Sjoberg and Gentry stipulate that, “portrayals of women terrorists rarely if 
ever characterize them as having individual agency in general or with respect to their violence 
 
18 Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Mothers, Monsters, Whores, 7.  
19 Caron Gentry, “Neo-Orientalist Narratives of Women’s Involvement in al-Qaeda,” in Women, Gender and 
Terrorism, 178. 
20 Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics, 22. 
21  Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, Women, Gender and Terrorism, 6. 
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specifically.”22 They also note, according to a feminist understanding of relational autonomy, 
human choice is never entirely free, but it is also never entirely constrained.”23 This reiterates the 
complexity of women’s choice when participating in violence, but shows that it is not always 
clear-cut. “Violent women have agency in their violence,” but the decision to participate in 
violence is often influenced by social and political factors.24 Additionally, the idea that choice is 
not necessarily free, but impacted by limitations, displays the power dynamics of choice in 
violent groups.  Women do rationally and knowingly choose to participate in terrorism but their 
actions and radicalization is often examined through gendered constructs. Instead, women should 
be viewed as violent people, not just violent women, women are involved in violence in global 
politics.25 In order to fully comprehend women’s participation and roles in terrorism, one has to 
look beyond the common focus of viewing women as subjects of a patriarchal structure. Women 
do participate in violence, but it is the representation of these women in global politics that needs 
to be analyzed, not necessarily the violence.  
 As mentioned above, there seems to be an overwhelming notion that women are not 
capable of being violent individuals or even worse, terrorists. Women who participate or support 
terrorism are often demonized and criticized more harshly than their male counterparts. Why is 
that the case? In Mothers, Monsters, Whores, Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, open their book 
with the example of a female suicide bomber to show that the image of women as mothers, peace 
lovers, and emotionally driven is not always an accurate depiction.26 People need to look beyond 
the misperception of women solely as maternal and nonviolent beings. Farhana Qazi, a scholar 
 
22 Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, Women, Gender and Terrorism, 4. 
23 Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores, 196. 
24 Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores, 21. 
25 Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Thinking about Women’s Violence in 
Global Politics, 2. 
26 Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores, 1. 
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on conflicts in the Middle East with a focus on women in war, notes that even researchers are 
guilty of falling into the trap of considering these Muslim women as second class, because the 
“idea of it [their participation in political violence] runs counter to Western stereotypes and 
misconceptions of male terrorists.”27 Additionally, Mia Bloom analyzes that even the women 
who were suicide bombers are not viewed the same as men who perpetrate the same violence.28  
 Sjoberg and Gentry explain the title of their book, Mothers, Monsters, Whores by arguing 
that women are usually seen in three categories when it comes to violence. As mothers, who act 
violent, they are considered to be driven by their “biological destinies,” as monsters, they were 
categorized as being a lost cause, damaged, broken, or preeminently driven to violence. The last 
categorization, is women as whores, and the misconception is that these women are just too 
sexually depraved or dependent.29 These ideas and labels are all part of gender constructs that are 
based on what is an “appropriate” description for a female. In “Women fighters and the 
‘beautiful soul’ narrative,” Laura Sjoberg discusses Jean Elshtain’s examination of women as an 
object of war.30 Women are described as ‘beautiful souls,’ and categorized as innocent and 
completely removed from war. They again are only categorized in their assumed gender 
classification, as mothers and nurtures, considering them automatically as more peaceful than 
men.31  
It is unfortunate that these gender norms are not looked beyond. Women, just like men 
can be violent with no correlation to the constructs of mother, monster or whore. As some 
women step out of these “normal” classifications, they become subject to more criticism for 
 
27 Katherine Brown, "Blinded by the Explosion? Security and Resistance in Muslim Women’s Suicide Terrorism," 
204. 
28 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 216. 
29 Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics, 12. 
30 Laura Sjoberg, “Women fighters and the ‘beautiful soul’ narrative,”  55. 
31 Laura Sjoberg, “Women fighters and the ‘beautiful soul’ narrative,” 57. 
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defying those norms. In reality, women who join terrorist networks are not completely 
disconnected or different from men who join. As evaluations continue about women’s 
relationship to violence, it is important not to solely focus on the gender constructs. Although 
female participation is currently at a lesser rate than male participation, it is essential to avoid the 
idea of women being “strange,” and unlike others for being attracted to terrorism, based purely 
on their gender.  For the sake of this research, I will analyze the violence, and ultimately argue 
women’s agency is evident, but like Sjoberg and Gentry suggest, relational autonomy must be 
considered. Limitations surrounding agency exist, as does the complication of free choice while 
existing under a patriarchal structure like the Islamic State or al-Qaeda.  
 
IV. The Phenomenon: Violent Women 
History of Women’s Involvement in Violence 
 Women’s participation in terrorism and presence in violent organizations is not 
necessarily a new phenomenon. In order to understand the more recent cases of female 
perpetrators, a brief literature survey of the history of women’s involvement in other violent 
groups is needed. It is essential to note that that women’s participation in violence is not 
embedded in only one region, religion, or ideology. This occurs globally and not only in Muslim-
majority countries. Women have been involved in terrorist organizations and violence long 
before the emergence of groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Mia Bloom, a scholar of 
International Studies with expertise in terrorism discusses women’s presence in violence in her 
book Bombshell. She notes, “female terrorists came from all parts of the globe and from all 
walks of society – they were part of Italy’s Red Brigades, Germany’s Baader-Meinhof group, the 
American Black Panthers, and Weatherman, and the Japanese Red Army…” among many 
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others.32 By pointing out other organizations over the course of many decades one can 
understand that the presence of women in violent organizations is not uncommon.  
For more specific examples, Azza Karam, a scholar of political Islam, examined three 
individual women in Egypt who were politically active and from middle class backgrounds 
during the 20th century, specifically from the 1920s to 1960s.33 In her article “Islamisms and 
Feminism in Egypt: Three Generations of Women’s Perspectives,” she analyzed a woman named 
Zaynab Al-Ghazali, who encouraged other women to maintain their roles as mothers and 
supporters of their husbands, who were fighters.34 It was their way of contributing to jihad, by 
encouraging and supporting their husbands.35 Karam analyzes these specific cases, which relate 
more to the scope of this paper. 
Several other scholars have explored women’s involvement in terrorism. Rushworth 
Kidder discussed a young girl, as one of the first recognized female suicide bomber in 1985.36 
Bloom also mentions this same example in Bombshell, where she provides further details about 
the young girl. Sana’a Mehaydali was seventeen years old when she was sent by the Syrian 
Socialist National Party, where she detonated herself near an Israeli convoy.37 Although all 
details of this act are not known, Bloom explains that the group was pro-Syrian and Lebanese.38 
Mehaydali may have been influenced heavily by her participation in the political group.  
 
32 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 33. 
33 Azza Karam, "Islamisms and Feminism in Egypt: Three Generations of Women's Perspectives," in Right Wing 
Women: From Conservatives to Extremists Around the World, 229. 
34 Azza Karam, "Islamisms and Feminism in Egypt,” 229. 
35 Azza Karam, "Islamisms and Feminism in Egypt,” 229. 
36 Rushworth Kidder, “The Terrorist Mentality,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1986, in Violence and 
Terrorism 90/91: 31. 
37 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 23.  
38 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 23. 
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Mia Bloom also discusses the case of female suicide bombers in Chechnya, known as the 
Black Widows.39 Women participated in taking hostages along with the Chechen men.40 Bloom 
provides information noting that some of the female terrorists had previously suffered 
themselves.41 What could their own experiences of violence mean? Their actions may have been 
in response to the loss of life during conflict. Was the violence they perpetrated a form of 
cultural violence, a justification for the loss of life? Some of the female terrorists had asked for 
male guidance and permission before instructing the hostages or before carrying out the suicide 
bombings. One woman mentioned specifically, was Zura Barayeva, who was noted to have more 
control than many of the other women who participated.42 Although these women were involved, 
some willingly, inflicting types of violence on others, this example provides insight about the 
complicated nature of choice. The women’s agency existed, but in this case, men were still 
involved and wielded a certain level of assumed authority.  
The violence perpetrated by women is not unique to any group or religion, however 
women’s participation in violence is increasing.43 The scholarship demonstrates that there are 
several instances of women’s participation, encouragement, or both, in politically motivated 
violent groups, and terrorist organizations in the past. These examples briefly show the history of 
women’s association with terrorist organizations, or similar violent groups. This foundation, 
allows for a closer examination of the more current and increasing involvement of women within 
the Islamic State, which will be explored later.  
 
 
39 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 52. 
40 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 54 
41 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 56. 
42 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 57. 
43 Hamoon Khelghat-Doost, “Women of the Islamic State: The Evolving Role of Women in Jihad,” 25 
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V. Terrorist Groups  
Al-Qaeda & the Islamic State  
 Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are well-known terrorist groups that perpetrate violence 
globally. Before discussing the viewpoints of these terrorist organizations concerning female 
participation in violence, it is first essential to introduce them. Al-Qaeda is the terrorist 
organization founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988.44 Several of the original members of the 
group acted as mujahedeen, or fighters, who participated in defeating the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan.45 By the mid-1990s, the terrorist organization had grown greatly, and after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it had garnered major attention as one of the deadliest 
terror groups.46 The Islamic State has its origins in Iraq. Although it did not grow specifically out 
of al-Qaeda, one of the branches, al-Qaeda in Iraq, helped influence the formation of what would 
be known as the Islamic State.47 A Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was the leader of al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI).48 Members of AQI eventually joined the Islamic State around 2013, whose goal 
was similar to al-Qaeda’s, in perpetrating global jihad, but also expanded upon it.49 The Islamic 
State desired to create a physical Islamic State, and in doing so, carried out some of the cruelest 
violence in the Middle Eastern region and around the world. 50  Although al-Qaeda had discussed 
the idea of a broader ideological state, there was little emphasis on obtaining physical territory.  
 
44“Al Qaeda,” Center for International Security and Cooperation. Stanford University; Daniel Byman, “Comparing 
Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets.”  
45 “Al Qaeda,” Center for International Security and Cooperation. Stanford University; Daniel Byman, “Comparing 
Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets.”  
Qaeda.” Center for International Security and Cooperation. Stanford University. 
46 “Al Qaeda,” Center for International Security and Cooperation. Stanford University; Daniel Byman, “Comparing 
Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets.”  
47 “The Islamic State,” Center for International Security and Cooperation. Stanford University; Daniel Byman, 
“Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets.”  
48 “The Islamic State,” Center for International Security and Cooperation.   
49 “The Islamic State,” Center for International Security and Cooperation.   
50 Hamoon Khelghat-Doost, “Women of the Islamic State: The Evolving Role of Women in Jihad,” 21. 
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Although there are many other terrorist organizations around the world, these two 
specific organizations were chosen for analysis. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are often viewed 
as similar organizations, one even stemming from the other, when in reality there are major 
differences between the groups. However, both organizations speak to their ideals about the 
women’s place in terrorism, but provide insight into the complex nature of decisions within a 
terrorist organization. The Islamic State’s ideology and al-Qaeda’s viewpoints about women’s 
involvement in jihad differ, Al-Qaeda is introduced to serve as a comparison, to show the drastic 
and cruel tactics of the Islamic State, as they utilize women’s participation in carrying out 
violence.  
 
Differing Viewpoints of al-Qaeda 
 The increase of appeal towards joining terrorist organizations does not mean that 
women’s participation is necessarily welcomed.  Al-Qaeda, spearheaded by Bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri, did not necessarily accept the idea of women’s involvement in jihad in its violent 
form. Ayman al-Zawahiri was known for rejecting women in jihad armed military action, and so 
was his wife, Omayma, although she encouraged women recruitment strictly in support roles. 
She noted that women should not be a part of jihad, “"It is not easy for women…and it is 
forbidden for her to move without being accompanied by male relatives and jihad requires 
mobility," she argued.”51 Bin Laden himself rarely spoke about women fighting jihad. One of the 
only times he did approve of violence done by women was when he spoke about becoming a 
father to a daughter, Safia, after 9/11 and he said she would “kill enemies of Islam like Safia of 
the Prophet’s time.”52 He named his daughter after a woman who previously participated in 
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religious violence, at least according to him. Bin Laden was more known for his views for 
women fulfilling support roles. In one of his fatwas he praised women for setting “a tremendous 
example for generosity in the name of Allah. They motivate and encourage their sons, brothers 
and husbands, to fight for the cause of Allah… they encourage jihad.”53 Bin Laden offers his 
praise for the support roles that women carry out, not for violent tactics or participation 
themselves in the actual jihad. It is often the case of older leaders, like Bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri to have a more conservative ideology when it comes to the place of women. It is also 
essential to note that terrorist organizations view jihad in a specific and gendered way. They have 
a singular understanding of jihad and therefore do not always incorporate women into that 
ideology. Although, it is not strictly just the older figures of the organization that view women’s 
position as strictly within the family. In 2016, in an online publication in Inspire, one of al-
Qaeda’s members, Al Malahelm, who controls the media of the magazine urged men not to 
incorporate women into attacks. He further stated, “In accordance with this incident, we guide 
and advise our mujahedeen brothers in the west not to allow our Muslim sisters to participate in 
any lone jihad operation.”54 Certain al-Qaeda members harshly criticized female participation in 
jihad that occurred under the Islamic State’s leadership, although that is true for some, it is not 
always the case.  
 Some affiliates, and other infamous leaders of branches of al-Qaeda have knowingly used 
women to participate in jihad and encourage their incorporation into the organization. Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq led by the well-known Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started using females as suicide bombers 
in 2005.55 This proved to be an effective tool for him, because it heightened his recruitment and 
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enabled him to carry out less obvious attacks. He was the first to utilize women as suicide 
bombers in al-Qaeda in Iraq and this separated him from other leaders.56 It appears as if his 
ability to make such decisions may have been due to Bin Laden’s lack of major power at the 
time. Al-Qaeda leaders Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri did not approve of al-Zarqawi’s more violent 
tactics. Bin Laden had disagreed with al-Zarqawi’s violence, as he was concerned with 
“alienating local populations.”57 Additionally, Al-Zawahiri condemned al-Zarqawi more than 
once and this created a tension between the two major affiliates at the time.58 As of 2011, al-
Qaeda in Iraq under al-Zarqawi was the only al-Qaeda affiliate to use females as suicide 
bombers.59 In a way, his decision to include women’s participation in jihad as suicide bombers 
shows his ideology was more aligned with the future Islamic State, whose ideology and 
formation was influenced by al-Qaeda in Iraq.60 These decisions to allow for women’s 
participation severed al-Qaeda in Iraq with al-Qaeda Central under Zawahiri and bin Laden.61  
 
Shifting Perspectives of the Islamic State 
 In Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State originally maintained that women should remain 
caretakers and supporters of those already fighting.62 Furthermore, “ISIS propaganda clearly 
propagates women as vital components of the ‘state’, but stipulates that they cannot engage in 
combat, unless attacked,” so using them as suicide bombers runs contrary to their initial 
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viewpoints.63 Although ISIS in Syria and Iraq were not originally known for deploying female 
suicide bombers, other ISIS affiliates have, and with little condemnation from the main group.64 
Affiliate groups like Boko Haram and ISIS in Libya have both used female suicide bombers and 
all over women are rising and attempting to become suicide bombers for the groups.65 These 
groups and even some lone wolf actors are considered affiliates of the Islamic State, where the 
main organization even claims responsibility of the attack, or influence over the affiliate.  
The Islamic State garnered more power and authority as they gained territory in Iraq and 
Syria. However, when their territory came under threat, some of their ideals regarding women’ s 
involvement in combat shifted. In July of 2017, the Islamic State had several female suicide 
bombers carry out attacks in Northern Iraq.66 Women were encouraged to participate in jihad, in 
different magnitudes, different roles, which will later be explored. The place of women began in 
the home, as mothers and supporters of jihad, but over time this expanded to also being 
recruiters.67  One of the major functions carried out by women within the Islamic State was 
security, where they were responsible for policing communities.68  This leads to the question, 
what is considered combat? What is an active role? Women acting as a police force can be 
considered a combatant on the home front compared to the front lines. The Islamic State’s 
ideology shifted further as they began losing even more territory and fighters. In 2016 and 2017, 
the terrorist group called on women in their publications al-Naba and Rumiya, explaining that it 
was necessary for women to take up arms and participate out of their love for jihad. Women 
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were allowed to participate to defend the caliphate.69 Rachel Bryson from the Tony Blair 
Institute for Global Change argues that this ideological shift can prove the weakness of the 
organization.70 They are realizing the advantages of using women as suicide bombers, meaning 
they are less conspicuous. Lydia Khalil, a scholar of International Relations with a focus on the 
Middle East, spoke about The Washington Post in her own report, noting they considered the 
Islamic State to be losing when it began asking women to participate in combat.71  
Ultimately the Islamic State is exploiting the place of women and using them solely when 
it is beneficial to them. If that means as suicide bombers, then they get to make that shift and 
deem it acceptable. Although this exploitation is not always visible, it is another demonstration 
of the Islamic State’s use of structural violence, even against women within their own 
organization. It is difficult to evaluate the place of women in the Islamic State, specifically 
within combat. They are usually seen as “tactical tools at the hands of men rather than active 
members of combat.”72 Although women’s involvement can be manipulated, that does not mean 
that they are not willingly deciding to be active members of the Islamic State participating in 
combat as will be shown below.  
 
The Islamic State & al-Qaeda: Brief Comparison 
 It appears as if al-Qaeda and the Islamic State initially struggled with the idea of allowing 
women to participate in jihad. They both asserted that the women’s place was in the home, as a 
supporter, cook, or a mother of future fighters. Her position was essential to raising new fighters, 
but staying on the sidelines. Women of course could not be equal to men, having the same 
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positions or becoming martyrs as suicide bombers like the men. The understanding of martyrdom 
by terrorist organizations is viewed completely in a masculine construct. Specifically, al-Qaeda 
was apprehensive about permitting women in combat. 
There is a shift, however, when the use of women becomes more beneficial to some these 
organizations. This shift was seen in al-Qaeda in Iraq, and eventually the Islamic State. Some of 
the more conservative leaders still speak out against women’s involvement, but there is a major 
shift in ideology around 2005 where some predecessors and affiliates of the organization 
encourage women’s participation. Even further, this support of women’s involvement may be 
due to the lower numbers of males willing to participate. For instance, al-Zarqawi’s, “intent in 
using women may partially have been to shame Muslim men into participation,” he additionally 
noted and spoke out saying things like “are there no men willing, so that we must turn to 
women?”73 The use of women in both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State highlights the differences 
in ideology among these groups. Al-Qaeda central completely distances themselves from al-
Qaeda in Iraq after al-Zarqawi’s violent tactics were utilized, and female suicide bombers were 
encouraged. The Islamic State took this further by encouraging women to join the organization, 
under the guise of empowerment. However, women seem to be the last resort, or the perfect tool, 
but never the first choice for either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. 
 
VI. Deemed Permissible 
 Terrorist’s Talk 
 The analysis of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State shows that both terrorist groups specify 
the roles for women belonging to the groups.  The two terrorist organizations indicate what 
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responsibilities women may have, but some Islamic scholars, and even women partake in 
dictating the appropriate positions of other women. As these evaluations are made about the 
place of women, it is essential to recognize that these thoughts are not representative of the larger 
Muslim community. Even the Islamic scholars who speak to the place of women in terrorism can 
be discredited by others. It is also important to note, that mostly men are defining what roles 
women are allowed to have. This dictation of roles is a form of structural violence, as briefly 
mentioned previously. This can be seen when the terrorist organization attempts to control the 
social structure and define women’s roles, perpetuating inequality. By commanding what women 
can and cannot do, results in injustices, which a form of violence that is not always seen or 
understood. The two terrorist organizations mostly note that women are supposed to remain in 
the home as supporters of jihad. They should raise future lions, and care for husbands, brothers 
and other fighters.  Rachel Bryson again speaks on this notion saying, “The perverted ideology 
that the group [ISIS] adheres to ordinarily maintains that women must be constrained to domestic 
isolation.74 Again, al-Qaeda reiterates the same notion, cheering women’s moral support.   
 
Religious Scholars? 
 There have been some male religious leaders who have expressed their position on the 
place of women within jihad. Farhana Qazi evaluates the major questions these religious scholars 
ponder. They question whether or not women should operate independently without male 
guardians when it comes to jihad.75 One Islamic scholar, Abdel Fattah Idrees describes the 
stipulations that need to be met for women to participate in jihad. He notes that women should 
participate in jihad if the Muslim lands are invaded, if the community calls for all Muslims’ help 
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in the matter, and if those women are specifically selected by male leaders.76 Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
takes this further and claims that women definitely have a place in jihad, arguing that they can 
attain martyrdom and sometimes achieve what men can’t.77  Another scholar argues that women 
can participate in jihad but only with a male guardian.78 It is interesting to see levels of approval 
of certain scholars that have published fatwas and other statements allowing women to 
participate.  
 
Al-Khansaa Brigade 
 The al-Khansaa Brigade reiterates the ideology of the terrorist organization in persuading 
women to join and encouraging support of terrorism in fulfilling limited roles. However, in this 
case, women are stipulating the place of other women. Their messages are a compilation of both 
suggesting women fight in jihad and fulfill those support roles. Al-Khansaa was originally a 
magazine and propaganda tool controlled by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. They published an article 
which discussed the roles of women as both fighters and supporters.79 This took a more 
prominent role when the al-Khansaa Brigade, or the women’s ‘police’ group of ISIS published a 
manifesto titled “Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case Study” which outlines the 
position of women within the Islamic State. It provides detailed and specific information as to 
how a woman should live her life within the organization. For example, the group mentions their 
major disagreements with the West’s notion of gender equality and concepts for human rights.80 
Although this notion isn’t completely Western, it is viewed as such as a propaganda tool and a 
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way to further show disagreement and separation from the enemy, the West. The manifesto also 
details the education requirements or lack thereof within the Islamic State. 81  Women should 
pursue a strictly religious education, but only until the age of 15 because, “there is no need for 
women to "flit here and there to get degrees and so on just so she can try to prove that her 
intelligence is greater than a man’s.”82 Furthermore, women may sometimes have more powerful 
roles as doctors and teachers, or even jihad, but usually only with the permission of a male.83 
This publication is fascinating because it is strictly women telling these other women what they 
should and should not do. There is a power structure of these women who have gained the 
authority and respect in order to outline the lives of these new women recruits and less prominent 
women. 
 
VII. How to Explain “Why?” 
 The idea of females as active perpetrators in terrorist organizations like the Islamic State 
is often questioned. Scholars analyze what attracts women to these groups, and why they 
ultimately decide to join. There are a number of reasons behind their involvement such as: belief 
in the agenda or cause of the organization, a desire for being considered a “true believer,” family 
ties, deaths, foreign policy grievances, frustration with military presence, limited access to 
education, marriages and marriage arrangements, and acts of xenophobia. Although not 
comprehensive, these are several influences that scholars examine as they attempt to answer why 
women join terrorist organizations. These factors encompass some of the women’s radicalization 
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causes, and provide insight as to “why” women radicalize and join terrorist groups like al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State. The categories explored show the complexity behind women’s 
involvement. In analyzing their participation, several scholars associate women’s radicalization 
with only personal reasons, specific to women. In reality, women’s radicalization influences are 
very similar to their male collaborators. Women’s violence and participation are not 
fundamentally different from men’s, and it is necessary to move beyond the gendered labeling of 
women while evaluating their violence.  
 
Family 
 Laura Sjoberg, Caron Gentry and other scholars attempt to uncover the major question in 
their edited book, Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Why do these women join these 
organizations? One of the contributors, Farhana Qazi, contributes to this question an article. She 
contends that family units often have a major impact on why women may join terrorist groups. 
She notes, “Women may be driven toward suicide terrorism when pressures from within their 
familial units and social structures violate, weaken or constrain their right to live.”84 There is a 
desire for individuality and power for these young women and sometimes certain patriarchal 
families may suppress that. Another example shows a young woman’s participation due to her 
families preexisting relationship with the Islamic State. Zaynab Sharrouf, a thirteen-year-old girl, 
and the rest of her family were brought into the Islamic State. Her father was already a 
participant in the terrorist organization and aided in the radicalization of some of his family. 
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Sharrouf’s marriage was arranged and then eventually she participated in jihadi rhetoric on 
Twitter.85  
 Death of women’s family members is another component of women’s drive to join these 
organizations. Another example that highlights women’s participation in terrorism is the case of 
Sajida Mubarak Atrous al-Rishawi. Al-Rishawi accompanied her husband on what was supposed 
to be a suicide attack in Jordan for al-Qaeda in Iraq.86 It was speculated that her involvement and 
radicalization in the first place may have been influenced by her resentment towards military 
forces that were suspected of killing close relatives and family members.87 This provided her 
with a motive to become more radical. These examples show that family can be a driving force 
for women’s participation in terrorism. In the case of al-Rishawi, it also shows that foreign 
policies and military actions abroad have an effect on these women.  
 
Foreign Policy & Xenophobia 
 Foreign policies and xenophobia are two factors that have some significance for women’s 
radicalization. In the case of foreign policy, the disagreement may stem from foreign policy and 
military decisions of Western countries, like the United States. The Islamic State specifically 
dwells on what they consider the wrongful ways of the United States in their magazine Dabiq, 
which reaches wide audiences. In many sections, the authors make a point of “the thousands of 
Iraqis and Afghans killed in U.S. military campaigns,” and use this to rile and attract individuals 
in joining.88 Just like al-Rishawi mentioned above, although it was her personal connection with 
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family deaths that furthered her radicalization, it was in part of the actions of U.S military in the 
Middle East. In many of these radical organizations one of the key frustrations cited is the 
foreign policy of the United States and their military presence in areas of the Middle East. Bin 
Laden specifically named foreign troop presence repeatedly as one of his grievances. These 
frustrations that motivate some to join a terrorist group are often explicitly associated with men. 
Women similarly experience foreign policy repercussions that can directly contribute to their 
radicalization.  
 Another potential area of radicalization may be based on experiences of xenophobic 
treatment. Islamophobia, “an extreme fear of and hostility toward Islam and Muslims,” 
 occurs in both small and large scales in both the private and public spheres.89 Malika el Aroud is 
an example of a woman who noted that her radicalization was in part of the racism she faced in 
Belgium. She was originally from Morocco and moved to Belgium at a young age. She went to 
school and was eventually expelled for attacking one of her teachers who made a racial 
comment.90 Malika stated that she was “treated like a dirty foreigner,” and radicalized partially 
as a “reaction to the right-wing racist xenophobia she encountered as an outsider in Belgium.”91 
Malika then turned to a more “fundamental” focus on Islam, eventually leading her and her 
husband into being al-Qaeda supporters and eventually members.  
In 2008, Gallup did a study on whether it was perceived that Muslims are respected and 
treated fairly in foreign countries. These are the findings… 
 “Globally, many Muslims report not feeling respected by those in the West. Significant 
 percentages of several Western countries share this sentiment, saying that the West does 
 not respect Muslim societies. Specifically, 52% of Americans and 48% of Canadians 
 say the West does not respect Muslim societies.”92  
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This shows that these viewpoints exist widely, whether or not radicalization occurs in some of 
these individuals because of it. Furthermore, many women are susceptible to propaganda, as they 
view themselves “as outliers of their community because of social injustice.”93 These feelings of 
frustration can lead women to thinking the Islamic State, for one example, can provide them a 
better life under their caliphate.  
The Institute for Strategic Dialogue provides even deeper analysis on the topics of 
Muslim women being outsiders in their communities. In the report “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ 
Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,” Erin Saltman and Melanie Smith evaluate the push and pull 
factors of Western women who join ISIS. They note that these women often feel ostracized by 
the societies they live in, sometimes questioning their identity or how they fit into the society 
they live in. There is a difficulty of identifying or assimilating with other cultures in the areas in 
which they live, and it often feels as if no positive changes are being made for these Muslim 
majority communities.94 Instead of participating in those changes some of these women turn to 
groups like ISIS, romanticizing the organization. 
 Regardless of the levels of radicalization, a specific mention from one of the Islamic 
State’s publications, Dabiq, helps to explain their viewpoints of the West. This illustrates both 
foreign policy disagreements but even further differences with the morals and values of the 
West, which plays into the religious divide that ISIS continues to push. The article in the 
magazine says, “The fact is, even if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, 
vilifying us, and usurping our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary reason 
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for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam.”95 This continued notion of the a 
“clash of civilizations,” helps to fuel resentment and participation in those already harboring 
anger towards the West. Terrorist groups repeatedly use this criticism to gain attraction and 
recruitment of others, including women. 
 
Religion & Marriage 
 There are several other factors of radicalization that will not be explored, but religion and 
marriage are major components that serve as connections to recruitment, which will be discussed 
later. There is a connection between marriage and joining these terrorist organizations. The idea 
of being the “true believer” of the right religion, in this case Islam, plays a major role in why 
individuals join. Some of these women are even converts from other Abrahamic religions or 
from no religious background at all. These converts can sometimes strive to find their place and 
rightful way, sometimes leaning to more radical interpretations. For women especially, there is 
sometimes a desire of being a part of an all-Islamic utopia that ISIS depicts in Syria and Iraq. On 
the other hand, Rafia Zakaria claims, “female recruits may ultimately discover… this is illusory 
and its promise of female empowerment false.”96 In another article this sentiment of an ideal life 
is reiterated by ISIS who attracts these women by promising “missions of divine responsibility 
and duty, [and] promise[s] liberation and an idealized, utopian existence in the caliphate.” It 
additionally notes that women sometimes are looking to reclaim their spirituality and join an 
Islamic sisterhood within the organization.97   Simon Cottee notes in an article in Foreign Policy 
that the women who join ISIS long to be a part of “the Islamic State,” not necessarily just the 
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terrorism organization, but the greater notion of an all-encompassing structure governed by Islam 
and Islamic law…well an interpretation of Islam at least.98 An even more interesting concept is 
that some of these women have a strictly conservative viewpoint on how women themselves 
should live their lives. They use the ideas of patriarchal societies and mix them with 
interpretations of Islam. Some of these women like that the ideas of ISIS match “with their 
militantly conservative notions of sex and gender. Hence, they support the Islamic State not 
despite, but because of, its aggressively patriarchal worldview.”99 This shows that several of 
these women may like the separation of sexes and subordinate roles to men. However, what are 
the limitations of this? There is an attempt to include this divine notion into the ideology to 
attract the religious side and piety of these women, although it is often distorted.  
 Marriage is considered another pull factor for women in terrorist organizations, which is 
seen especially in future involvement in the Islamic State. This concept is one that draws 
attention from many, but it is crucial to not view marriage as the only appeal for these women 
into terrorism. To continue with previous examples, both Malika el Aroud and Sajida al-Rishawi 
further radicalized after their marriages. Malika and her husband Abdessater trained under al-
Qaeda and interacted with Bin Laden. Her husband killed an individual, and Malika was 
considered complicit because of her financial aid that helped facilitate the murder.100 Al-Rishawi 
worked with her husband on an attempted suicide mission in Jordan, where he succeeded and she 
did not. Mia Bloom in her article “Women as Victims and Victimizers” notes that it is not always 
male coercion that leads women into terrorism, but their relationships with radicalized men can 
enable them to make their own decision in joining the cause with their significant other.101 These 
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examples show that women’s relationships may have had a correlation to their radicalization, but 
their agency and decision also has to be recognized. These women are still perpetrators for 
participating in different levels of violence. However, the limitations and struggles that were 
possibly experienced in making these decisions are unknown.  
 There are several cases of women from abroad traveling to become jihadi brides, 
although sometimes their positions advance to more than just a wife. The term and idea of jihadi 
brides is often exploited in modern media to, in a way, diminish the agency of women as actually 
deciding to participate in violence.  Even though some women first enter radical groups like ISIS 
as brides, that may not be the underlying cause of their radicalization or attraction in the first 
place. Additionally, women can sometimes rise to more prominent positions. The Bethnal Green 
schoolgirls are one very well-known group of young women who traveled to Syria to join the 
Islamic State. All three married ISIS fighters and two of the girl’s husbands died fighting, and 
the girls remained in Syria supporting the Islamic State.102 Another example is of the young 
woman named Aqsa Mahmood, who traveled to Syria and also married an ISIS fighter. Although 
the marriage helped solidify her place within the created Islamic State, she rose to some level of 
power, as a member of the Al-Khansaa Brigade.103 There was a peculiar case of a woman from 
Belgium named Laura Passoni, who joined ISIS as a bride, but claims she was seduced into 
doing so. Her background is interesting because she was originally a Catholic who converted to 
Islam and became more extreme. She married and traveled to Syria until she escaped.104 This 
specific case raises red flags because the young woman continues to claim that she never 
 
102 Lizzie Dearden, “Isis' British brides: What we know about the girls and women still in Syria after the death of 
Kadiza Sultana,” The Independent, August 12, 2016. 
103 Lizzie Dearden, “Isis' British brides.” 
104 Jake Cigainero, “A Belgian woman explains why she joined ISIS, and why she came back,” Public Radio 
International, December 9, 2016.  
 30 
watched the news or knew of any of the harsh life conditions in Syria. Her statements do not 
match up because she spoke about using Facebook frequently, which would likely have even the 
smallest bit of information about Syria on it. Nonetheless, this is another case of a woman 
joining and getting a foothold into the Islamic State based on marriage.  
 
The Four R’s 
 The Four R’s ideology examines factors that contribute to understanding women’s 
involvement in terrorism.  Mia Bloom created and examined this concept of the four R’s, 
explaining why women join terrorist groups. She evaluates women’s motivation and argues that 
their reasoning behind joining is often personal. To examine the personal reasons, she names the 
“four R’s,” revenge, redemption, respect and relationship.105 These four R’s relate to information 
and specific cases of women discussed above. Under the category of revenge, it is often the 
personal reason based on family death or foreign policy. For redemption, terrorism may be a 
channel for a woman to reinvent herself. Bloom provides an example in the case of a woman 
who may not bear children or who has a possible criminal record and misconduct.106 Respect is 
often sought by individual women who truly believe in the cause, and join to “prove their 
dedication,” and attempt to improve their status or others. Last is relationship, in the case of 
marriage or family affiliation with these organizations. Bloom provides this explanation of 
radicalization factors, and does note that they can also apply to men.107 However, viewing these 
few categories as pull factors for women can bring gendered assumptions about radicalization 
causes. Women do not always join terrorist groups for revenge, or to reinvent themselves. If men 
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do not need a reason to join the Islamic State, why is women’s participation so deeply questioned 
in comparison?  
 It is apparent that there is not typically just one pull factor for women who partake in 
terrorism, but often a combination of many causes that lead women to radicalizing. In analyzing 
what attracts women into joining groups like the Islamic State, it is evident that their 
radicalization is not always solely based on personal reasons. Women, like men, have concrete 
reasons for joining the organization. One should not look at why men join, and why women join, 
but recognize that individuals join for similar reasons. Their decisions not only based on gender. 
Although this is true, one must not forget that these individual women made the decision to join, 
support or participate in these organizations and the violence they incite and create, regardless of 
recruitment or persuasion by others. This should not take agency or responsibility away from 
these women or the groups in general. 
 
VIII. How does this happen? 
Recruitment & Propaganda:  
 The recruitment and propaganda tactics used by terrorist organizations helps facilitate the 
process of women joining these violent groups. The women are influenced and attracted by the 
ideology but often times interaction with recruiters and others already involved in the terrorist 
network help bring these women to actually participate or travel to the stronghold areas of these 
organizations. There is also the propaganda that calls on “good Muslims” from all over to uphold 
their duties and encourages them to participate in jihad. Two major methods of propaganda that 
both al-Qaeda and ISIS use for recruitment in general are their respective online magazines. ISIS 
publishes Dabiq, and has a new magazine as well titled Rumiya, but what is important to know is 
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that their publication is in several languages, including English, Arabic, French and Russian. 
This helps the terrorist organization to disseminate their information to many readers around the 
world, therefore attracting a wide variety of persons. In these magazines specifically, they depict 
graphic images of women and children hurt or killed by U.S. bombings.108  This has the potential 
to cause anger and influence radicalization as ISIS intends it to. Inspire, the al-Qaeda 
publication, has similar tactics and depictions to Dabiq. 
 Another rising method of recruitment is through social media outlets. This tactic has been 
a major means of recruitment for women from many regions. The Bethnal schoolgirls were even 
radicalized online, where they were encouraged to join and travel to Syria.109 The other woman 
previously discussed, Laura Passoni, created a Facebook where she posted extremist images and 
posts that made her the perfect target for an ISIS recruiter.110 The use of such media sources like 
their online publications, Facebook and even Twitter provides an outreaching network beyond 
the boundaries of the small caliphate ISIS once had. Modern methods allow for terrorist 
organizations to spread their ideology to areas like the West. For example, the Islamic State or 
any of their affiliates did not officially train or direct Tashfeen Malik, one of the perpetrators of 
the San Bernardino terrorist attack in California.111 Malik resided in California, but because of 
modern technologies and social media it was very easy for the Islamic State to claim 
responsibility for attacks and for their aggressive rhetoric to spread.112  
 Further means of recruitment come from statements from respected individuals within the 
organization that resonate to others. Women already in the organizations sometimes speak out, 
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encourage and call upon other women to join and give their support. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s wife, 
Omayma, even spoke out on behalf of al-Qaeda, encouraging women to support jihad, but only 
by support and non-violent roles.113 Additionally, a female ISIS blogger, Umm-Layth also 
participates in recruitment. She notes… 
 
 Our role is even more important as women in Islam, since if we don’t have sisters with 
 the correct Aqeedah [conviction] and understanding who are willing to sacrifice all their 
 desires and give up their families and lives in the west in order to make Hijrah 
 [migration] and please Allah, then who will raise the next generation of Lions?”114   
 
This shows similar sentiment to Omayma who is urging women to provide support in raising 
new fighters. As mentioned previously, the al-Khansaa Brigade encourages women to join and 
fit into specific roles to aid in the functioning of terrorist organizations. One woman who joined 
ISIS from Glasgow, Aqsa Mahmood aided in spreading ISIS propaganda, and even managed to 
become an important figure in the al-Khansaa Brigade.115 Another woman, known as Shams, 
meaning sun in Arabic, operates a blog that is very useful for ISIS recruitment. She describes life 
in the Islamic State as a utopia and romanticizes what goes on within the organization and her 
marriage.116 These examples show another aspect of bringing women into terrorism, even by 
other women. There has also been more encouragement from men in terrorist organization for 
women to join. This seems to be a tactic utilized when there is lower participation of men. The 
organizations call upon women, who are often considered subordinate to men by terrorists, with 
the attempt to encourage men to join and rise, especially if more women are joining in 
comparison.  
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They Come from There? 
 There are many aspects that attract groups of women into joining terrorist organizations 
and recruitment methods help to ensure that path. What is interesting is the demographic 
background of where women travel from to specifically go to Syria or Iraq. There is a wide range 
of diversity of women who risk it all to participate in terrorism in any way they can. Sometimes 
individuals who do not study concepts of terrorism or the Middle East region have trouble 
understanding why women travel from all over the world to join ISIS. They can’t fathom it. In 
reality, female foreign recruits, fighters, migrants, however one wants to define them, make up a 
surprising number.  The Institute for Strategic Dialogue found in their study that, “the number of 
Western foreign fighters and migrants to ISIS is estimated to be up to 4,000, with over 550 
women within this figure.”117 That’s a large number to consider. The Institute also created a 
graphic in May of 2015 that was used by many media source to provide a visual of what 
countries women were traveling from.  
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Figure 1. Institute for Strategic Dialogue –Foreign Female ISIS Recruits118 
 
 
This above image shows the possible nationality of female ISIS recruits up until 2015. This of 
course does not account for the many individuals who traveled during after this period to ISIS 
territory while they still held a large stronghold of land. The numbers now may be diminished 
but this ultimately provides a nice visual to show the background of women going to participate 
in terrorism. To offer another group of statistics, Rafia Zakaria also spoke about the numbers of 
women traveling to support ISIS. 
“About 10 percent of foreign recruits from Europe, North America and Australia are 
women. Of these approximately two hundred women and girls, the majority are believed 
to be between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Seventy women are thought to have 
come from France, sixty from the United Kingdom, and scattered numbers from other 
European nations and from Canada. Two American women from Denver and 
Minneapolis have probably joined the group as well.”119  
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This map highlights that the majority of women traveling to ISIS territory are from Western 
countries. Additionally, several of the women previously discussed, including the Bethnal 
schoolgirls, Aqsa Mahmood, Laura Passoni, are all foreign recruits. It is also noteworthy to point 
out that one of al-Qaeda’s second female suicide bombers was from Belgium. Myrium Goris, 
also known as Muriel Degauque, was the first female European suicide bomber.120 Even more 
striking, was that she was a convert to Islam, originally being a Catholic. Her background and 
ability to actually carry out an attack made her a model to other Western recruits, and a model as 
a successful woman suicide bomber.121 Overall, these women are joining militant groups from 
many regions of the West.  
 
What about Age? 
Another noteworthy aspect is the age range of these women, who are mostly younger, with 
ages ranging from teens to young women in their mid-twenties. Several young Western women 
“are mainly aged between 16 and 24, but even younger girls have attempted to travel to Syria,” 
to join the Islamic State.122Are these younger women more susceptible to radical ideology?  
Some argue that many young ISIS sympathizers are bored and romanticize the idea of terrorism 
based due to their naivety.123 Additionally they can be “influenced by the glamour of images of 
war with a case.”124 Even if these are factors are contributed to age, there are several other 
components that should be explored, like scientific explanations of maturity levels and brain 
development. Some teens may not have the capacity to understand the risk assessment and other 
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dangerous factors in joining this type of violence. Although the age range of women who join the 
Islamic State, specifically from the West, are often mentioned, there is little analysis about the 
impact a woman’s age has in her decision to participate in terrorism. Further study is needed 
regarding the correlation between radicalization and age. However, it may be difficult for many 
to comprehend, and additional research is required, but these young women are being attracted 
from all over the world, to the ideology of terrorist groups like the Islamic State. 
 
Increasing Numbers 
 As the Islamic State previously gained territory and increased their power, more women 
fled to join the organization. Since 2014 the number of women in the Islamic State steadily 
increased. They made up nearly 10 percent of the Islamic State’s foreign fighters.125 In February 
2017, it was reported that female foreign recruits “accounted for one-fifth of all foreign recruits,” 
in Syria.126 The Islamic State “recruited women on an unprecedented scale.”127 As they recruited 
these women, some of the ideological changes of the organization shifted to incorporate these 
women.128 Although women may not have the authority over the roles they play once involved in 
the Islamic State, the increase of women’s participation continued at both large and small scales. 
In 2019, as the Islamic State was losing the acquired territory, women still remained a large 
presence in their ranks. They represented “up to 16 percent of foreign nationals who traveled to 
join the group in Iraq and Syria.”129 Additionally, these numbers may not even reflect the female 
locals who were already members of the Islamic State. To date, the Islamic State may have lost 
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the majority of the territory, but female presence remains within the organization. Further 
evaluation will be needed in the future to understand the implications of women’s participation 
on the terrorist network. As the Islamic State territory and power diminishes and an attempt to 
regain authority is made, new opportunities could be presented to female terrorists in the 
organization.  
 
IX. Women’s Roles in Terrorism 
Assumed Roles  
There are several women who are members of terrorist groups like the Islamic State that 
fulfill roles within the private sphere, or behind closed doors. These roles are those of mothers, 
nurturers, and educators. However, these roles, according to the Islamic State, are all roles that 
help further the aims of the Islamic State. These roles are also seen when women participate in 
recruitment. Furthermore, the Islamic State frames and shapes these roles, considering them as 
ways of female empowerment. Sustaining and supporting male fighters is assumed to be a 
powerful role.130 In an attempt to maintain the social structure, keeping women in the private 
sphere, the men suggest that they educate and raise future fighters and emphasize that this can 
empower women. Women’s role was “to give birth to, and raise and indoctrinated future 
generations of jihadists.”131 Their assumed roles, were considered domestic and supportive. 
However, even in these roles, women were able to actively participate in areas of assisting the 
Islamic State. These roles also could have led to power opportunities, where women could 
eventually work their way into the public sphere.  
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Actual Roles of Women 
 Women in terrorist organizations do not always settle for support roles considered fitting 
by their male counterparts. In many cases women start out as nurturers and supporters of those in 
jihad in addition to taking care of the home. But women don’t stop there. Many of these 
radicalized women use the place of being a homemaker within the terrorist organization to 
solidify their place before attempting to grow. Often times they may not even realize they are 
defying the conservative norms of strictly adhering to what the men, or even women say about 
being those supporters at home. Women played a major role in actively aiding the Islamic State 
by conducting recruitment. The majority of the Western female recruits left for the Islamic State 
territory as a result of the propaganda and recruitment methods.132 In reality, even the women of 
the al-Khansaa Brigade have defied the “gender norms” of the Islamic State. Even though they 
speak on behalf of the men, they have earned a level of power and prominence because they are 
allowed to even speak out and continue to do so, asserting their own authority over other women. 
Aqsa Mahmood is an example of a young woman who had an actual role in the Islamic State by 
being a leader in the Al-Khansaa Brigade.133  Shams is another example of a women who entered 
through marriage, but gained prominence through her blog and within the healthcare system of 
the Islamic State. She operates a clinic and provides services for women and children.134 
Although these roles are not necessarily ground breaking, for these women in the Islamic State it 
shows that they do have some levels of legitimate positions and responsibilities.  
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Suicide Bombers & Combatants  
 Women have also been able to participate in terrorism as suicide bombers for terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS. Although initially both groups shied away from using 
women as bombers, some leaders have allowed for this shift in ideology. This shift shows that 
women do have responsibilities, even as suicide bombers in the organization. The use of female 
suicide bombers to carry out terrorist attacks is also on the rise, “statistics show that between 
1981 and 2007 women carried out approximately 26 percent of all suicide attacks and that there 
has been a marked rise in women’s participation in such attacks since 2005.”135 In the study of 
al-Qaeda and ISIS, use of female suicide bombers was and still is usually carried out in Iraq. In 
July of 2017 alone, around 20 female suicide bombers detonated themselves in civilian areas 
around Mosul.136 Prior to that, many other attacks were carried out in Iraq under the instruction 
of al-Zarqawi from al-Qaeda. The first, whose name to this day is still unknown, was dressed as 
a man as she carried out her attack in Talafa, Iraq in September of 2005.137 As previously 
mentioned, Myrium Goris, the Belgian woman, detonated herself as a suicide bomber in Iraq in 
November 2005.138 Just these few examples show that women have been, and are in fact given 
responsibilities and enough power to participate in violence, and in this case, direct physical 
violence. There is a “significant increase in the number of women joining in combat.”139 
Whether or not women’s willingness to partake in suicide bombing is utilized for the patriarchal 
agenda of the terrorist organization, they still have a certain level of agency in implementing 
violence.  
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Women’s Ages & Roles 
As the number of female memberships in the Islamic State rises, further evaluation is needed 
about their age ranges and roles. Does age factor into what roles women are given or obtain 
while under the Islamic State? There seems to be an increase in attraction to the Islamic State by 
young woman around the world.140 Although the participation numbers are often examined, few 
scholars analyze the potential of age influencing women’s roles. Amanda Spencer, in her article 
“The Hidden Face of Terrorism: An Analysis of Women in the Islamic State,” provides a data 
examination of women’s age and roles. Her findings are paraphrased here,  
“Evidence regaled that 53% of women serving the role of a wife are between the ages of 
14 and 18, while 56% of mothers are 25 and up…50% of female recruiters are between 
the ages of 19 and 24… Female patrol officers are predominantly between the ages of 19 
and 22. Women that occupy an authoritative position are generally older, between the 
aged of 24 and 27, with only one case that is under 21 years old.”141 
 
These numbers indicate that there could be a relationship between age and role for women within 
the Islamic State. Women who are older may possess or earn power in roles overtime. However, 
what is considered older? What is considered a powerful position? In these statistics, it is evident 
that each age range of women occupy certain essential roles for the Islamic State. The majority 
of women in this case study are still within their young adulthood. The study does not specify 
whether this data is based on only foreign recruits or if it contains information about the local 
population of women involved in the Islamic State, and those categories are also blurred. As the 
Islamic State does recruit more women, it is evident that many recruits are young women from 
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the West. However, findings and statistical information about women’s age within the Islamic 
State and their roles is limited and should be studied further.  
Women in the Islamic State 
Women involved with the Islamic State both inflict violence upon others and experience 
levels of violence themselves. In 2019, filmmaker Thomas released the third part of his 
documentary titled, “Women of ISIL.”142Al-Jazeera, a news network based in the Middle East, 
provided an edited five-part series of the documentary that highlighted the lives of several 
women living under the leadership of the Islamic State. In these recollections, women tell their 
stories of being, torturers, wives, a teacher, a nurse, and a hairdresser.143 Each woman who 
shared parts of their trauma had different levels of experience and exposure to violence. 
However, there is a commonality that although all of these women have different stories, some 
were victims, some were perpetrators, and some were both.  
In the first installment, women who acted as torturers for the religious police in the 
Islamic State share their stories. These women inflicted harsh violence on other women, but how 
can their choice be analyzed? One woman, Aisha, also known as Umm Qaqaa, became a widow 
after her husband became a martyr for the Islamic State. She noted “I had no more money. I had 
no choice but to work for them.”144 How can someone evaluate her levels of complicity and 
agency while working under the Islamic State? Aisha worked for the policing unit and often 
policed other women. She was in charge of looking for women who violated the Islamic State’s 
dress code.145 She recalled “sometimes we had 30,40 women, sometimes 10, or 20. It depended 
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on the number of violations. But we never came back empty.”146 Her experience demonstrates 
the complexity of women’s position in the Islamic State. Aisha was responsible for policing and 
implementing torture against other women in the territory. This shows that she acted as a 
perpetrator, participating in violence, but what were the limitations behind her choice? Was she 
also a victim of the Islamic State’s manipulation? Was she forced to participate? She also 
mentions that other women, the women of the Islamic State were in charge of policing her in 
carrying out this violence. This also shows that women do possess levels of authority, even if 
that authority was given by male leadership.  
 
X. Violence against Women 
Although this paper has examined the place of women within terrorist violence, it is also 
essential to briefly discuss the violence that the Islamic State perpetrates against women, both 
within and under their organization, and towards those they capture. This brief examination 
demonstrates that although women actively participate in violence in the Islamic State, women 
are often the target of some of the harshest violence of organization, and this violence takes 
several different forms. 
 
Women Under the Islamic State 
The remaining four installments of the “Women of ISIL” documentary highlight the stories 
of women who were victims of violence at the hands the Islamic State. These women 
experienced both physical and emotional violence. In one of the stories, a wife of an Islamic 
State militant was forced to watch punishments carried out by other members against a 
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woman.147 Although this woman did not endure the physical violence herself, being a part of this 
situation was a different form of inflicting violence and fear, a type of structural violence. This 
structural violence is represented through the restrictive social structure of the Islamic State 
demonstrated through male control in this specific example. This same kind of fear was 
experienced by a school teacher in the Islamic State territory. Ayat, a 27-year-old teacher was 
threatened by the Islamic State for deviating from their jihad centered curriculum. In sharing her 
experience, she reported that she was always on guard after that, even in her home, in constant 
fear.148 A fellow teacher also deviated from the Islamic State’s teaching requirements and was 
stoned to death.149 These examples demonstrate different levels of both nonphysical and physical 
violence as perpetrated by the Islamic State. These women even belonged through the 
organization through relationships with their husbands, and they endured the same violence the 
terrorist organization perpetrates against innocent victims around the world.  
Two other experiences were shared by a hairdresser and a nurse, who like the other women, 
experienced nonphysical violence by the Islamic State. The young nurse, Yasmine was 
responsible for delivering future Islamic State children, but had limited influence over her own 
medical practices, and no mobility outside of the home to shop.150 Her freedom was completely 
restricted. She also divulged that there were surveillance cameras all over the hospital.151 Is 
constant surveillance a different form of violence of the Islamic State, a type of structural 
violence? Another method of instilling fear? Lastly, the hair dresser attempted to defy the 
Islamic State by keeping her salon open in Mosul. They eventually found out and raided it. She 
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continued to take clients at home, but expressed how fearful it was every day.152  There were 
major differences between women living under the Islamic State, as they were, in comparison to 
women working for the Islamic State. These women, who were active participants had different 
privileges, such as more freedom of mobility, access to money, and cigarettes.153 Each of these 
recollections illustrate that instilling constant fear, is a form of terrorism and violence. These 
women living under the Islamic State’s territory experienced this violence daily. More 
importantly, it shows that violence does not always have to be visible, or physical to be real.  
 
Women as Targets of Sexual Violence  
The Islamic State has perpetrated appalling sexual violence against women taken captive 
from conquests but also within their already acquired territory. They use systematic rape as a 
weapon of war, specifically against minority communities like the Yazidis. Fawaz A. Gerges in 
his book A History of ISIS, argues that the Islamic State perpetrates ethnic cleansing when it 
comes to the Yazidi communities. He notes that they demonstrate a “systematic cultural 
cleansing” of Yazidis and the women are forced into sexual slavery.154 Furthermore, Gerges 
argues “ISIS’s involvement in the sex trade and its enslavement of girls and women from the tiny 
Yazidi religious community are driven not only by power and male (patriarchal) dominance but 
also by ideological zealousness.”155 The acts of using rape as a weapon of war is not an exclusive 
tactic of the Islamic State, but their actions have garnered abundant attention from the media, 
human rights organizations, and other state governments. The raping and enslavement of women 
did not go unnoticed. The Counter Extremism Project, a non- profit policy organization, has 
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researched and gathered reports about the violence of the Islamic State. In July of 2017 they 
published a report titled “ISIS’s Persecution of Women” which provides an overview about the 
cruel treatment women experience at the hands of the Islamic State. In their report they provide 
one of the key findings: 
“ISIS sanctions rape and physical abuse for girls as young as nine years old. Some 
survivors report that women are gang raped and subjected to gruesome punishments 
including beatings, and being forced to watch militants rape friends and family.156  
 
This information demonstrates that the Islamic State’s acts of violence are recognized and not 
hidden. The Counter Extremism Project emphasizes the Islamic State’s blatant disregard and 
manipulation of females. Most importantly, the CEP recognizes that although the Islamic State is 
losing territory, they are still a danger to females in the Middle East.157 The Islamic State’s 
ideology about the place of women is not limited to their territory. ISIS affiliates and supporting 
groups also commit horrifying violence against women outside of the Islamic State’s remaining 
grounds.  
 Rukmini Callimachi is a New York Times foreign correspondent who is well known for 
covering the violence of the Islamic State and evaluating their ideology. In August of 2015, 
Callimachi published an article titled “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape,” which detailed the 
Islamic State’s practice of systemic rape of Yazidi females. She notes, “The trade in Yazidi 
women and girls has created a persistent infrastructure, with a network of warehouses where the 
victims are held, viewing rooms where they are inspected and marketed, and a dedicated fleet of 
buses used to transport them.”158 Callimachi further discusses the process in which ISIS fighters 
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capture Yazidi women, separate them from men, and taken into trucks and buses before being 
sold. The Islamic State fighters even “conducted a census of their female captives.”159 The 
Islamic State is not only violating women, but doing it in a completely structured and organized 
manner, at least when they describe the practice. Is it to demonstrate power? Religious 
superiority? Or just patriarchal notions of ownership over women? 
 
XI. Conclusions:  
Is it Everything She Hoped For?  
 After women join the terrorist organizations, regardless of what roles they carry out, it is 
essential to examine their treatment while in the organization. These women are attracted to 
terrorist groups, specifically the Islamic State, and have a desire to be a participator or a 
supporter of jihad. Women join the Islamic State from all over the world, but major emphasis is 
placed on women coming from the West. The treatment of these women after they join or live 
under the authority of these organizations is not often what it seems. These women are promised 
a utopia, by the radical terrorist leaders and by recruiters but are those promises reality? Some 
women say no… Laura Passoni, the one woman who joined the Islamic State later fled after 
realizing the group’s harsh methods of brutality. One day, Islamic State fighters brought her son, 
who was four years old, home after being taught how to cut off a stuffed teddy bear’s head.160 
She had no control or power while being in the Islamic State, no control over her own life or her 
son’s.  
 When many of these women join, other and sometimes more powerful women within the 
organization, who are trusted to keep a close eye on new recruits or brides, keep them under 
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close watch. The al-Khansaa Brigade manifesto showed how repressive life was. If one did not 
comply or obey to the rules, they were harshly beaten and punished.161 This is a type of direct 
and physical violence women experience. The Islamic State and the al-Khansaa Brigade even 
mention that the age of marriage for girls is nine.162  In conflicts across the world, and in areas of 
violence and chaos, like under the Islamic State or affiliation with al-Qaeda, rape is a common 
practice in war.  Women experience physical and sexual violence, inside the Islamic State, and 
outside of the organization’s constraints. Some of this sexual violence is even facilitated with the 
help of other women.163 The violation and exploitation of women is not exclusive to terrorist 
organizations, but occurs frequently within these organizations.  
Although these women join terrorist organizations like the Islamic State, it is not always 
everything they hoped for. Some women experience extreme violence and mistreatment at the 
hands of both men and women in the organization. Foreign recruits have major difficulty 
adapting and locals are not always accepting to these women.164 This ostracization and 
purposeful oppression is another form of both structural and cultural violence. This leads some 
women to attempt to escape, or if they are lucky, there escape is successful. “They talk about 
shocking experience and awareness of having made the biggest mistake of their lives.”165 
However, once these women do leave the Islamic State, there are lasting repercussions for 
themselves, and regarding the possibility of their immersion back into society.  
 
Manipulation 
 
161 Lizzie Dearden, “Isis' British brides.” 
162 Heather Saul, “Life as a woman under Isis: Document reveals for the first-time what group really expects from 
female recruits living in Syria and Iraq.”  
163 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 237. 
164 Anita Perešin, "Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS," 29. 
165 Anita Perešin, "Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS," 28. 
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 As women gain ground within these organizations they do wield power, but often that 
power can be manipulated and utilized by their male counterparts. The manipulation women 
experience while involved in groups like the Islamic State is a type of structural violence. The 
tactics of the Islamic State are not always visible, but embedded in the social structure of their 
organization. However, many women capitalize on some of these power and leadership 
opportunities, even if that manipulation occurs. For example, terrorist leaders use female suicide 
bombers because they believe them to be more inconspicuous and therefore more successful. 
Women are not as suspected in public places, like airports, making them of “strategic value” to 
groups like al-Qaeda.166 They are not used because they are like the men, but a gender discussion 
suddenly arises because the female is, at the time, useful. But this also allows women to take 
ownership of their agency, and participate in the violence if that is their goal. Some of the main 
reasons for even permitting women to participate is the tactical advantage, but also the publicity 
that follows. Another major tactic is the use of women to encourage recruitment of other 
males.167 This plays into using those women to acquire more support. Like al-Zarqawi said, if 
females are participating, where are the men? At points where, male figures see female’s 
participation as fitting, their conservative viewpoints suddenly “go by the wayside.”168 Women 
are active participants in the violent tactics utilized by terrorist organizations. Like all 
individuals, they have the freedom of choice to join, and radicalize. However, as they participate, 
they often experience both empowerment and discrimination. 
   
Overall Significance  
 
166 Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics, 124. 
167 Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics, 127. 
168 Mia Bloom, Bombshell, 209. 
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  There are many reasons behind women’s decisions to participate in violence and join 
terrorist groups. Their influences and factors behind their radicalization should not be evaluated 
based on traditional gender norms or constructs. Women, like men, willingly participate in 
terrorist groups like the Islamic State, and have similar motivations for joining. Women are 
present as actors in terrorism in both the private and public sphere. Although their roles and 
actions are sometimes outlined by male figures and other prominent women in the organization, 
this does not mean their agency is absent. One must not take away their responsibility for their 
membership and participation in inflicting violence.  However, it must be recognized that in the 
constraints of any violent organization, certain choices and freedoms are limited, which can have 
a major impact on anyone’s experience. Although women in the Islamic State act as perpetrators, 
they often experience and witness brutal types of physical and nonphysical violence which can 
also allow them to experience victimization at the hands of the organization.  As continued 
research occurs in evaluating the roles of women in terrorist organizations, especially with the 
territorial decline of the Islamic State, gender needs to be a component of analysis while 
evaluating global politics. Women’s agency should not be overlooked, women too can be 
terrorists, but we must be cautious in how we represent violent women. 
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